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THE ETHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
Vincent R. Johnson*
Our Constitution... [and] Bill of Rights. . .[contain] protec-
tions of individual rights... [I]mportant as these guarantees are,
by themselves they were not a uniquely American contribution to
the art of government. Long before them England had produced
the Magna Carta, the Petition of Right, and the Declaration of
Rights. Simultaneously with them in France there was the Decla-
ration of the Rights of Man.
The uniquely American contribution consisted of the idea of
placing these guarantees in a written constitution which would be
enforceable by an independent judiciary. This idea that the rights
guaranteed by the Constitution would be enforced by judges who
were independent of the executive was something found in no
other system of government at that time. It was a unique Ameri-
can contribution to the theory and practice of government.
-Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist'
I. STRUCTURAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
When one thinks of the independence2 of the American judici-
ary, the mind focuses first on federal courts. There have been
many pivotal cases in which independent judges stood against the
tides of public opinion or the power of the legislative and executive
* Associate Dean and Professor of Law, St. Mary's University, San Antonio,
Texas. B.A., LL.D., St. Vincent College; J.D., University of Notre Dame; LL.M., Yale
University. Fulbright Senior Scholar, Renmin University of China, Beijing (1998).
Member, American Law Institute.
1. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Address at Northern Illinois School of
Law (Oct. 20, 1988).
2. There is a question as to how "judicial independence" should be defined. A
useful working definition was offered by Jean Reed Haynes, president of the Ameri-
can Judicature Society:
When AJS talks about independent judges or the concept of judicial inde-
pendence we mean that judges should be free from undue and inappropriate
pressures that detract from their ability to interpret laws and apply them to
the specific facts of the case.
An Interview with Jean Reed Haynes, President, American Judicature Society, THE
THIRD BRANCH: NEWSLErrER OF THE FEDERAL COURTS (Administrative Office of
the U.S. Courts, Washington, D.C.), Jun. 2001, at 10 (discussing the mission of the
Center for Judicial Independence).
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branches. The role of the federal courts in ending segregation, 3
holding presidents accountable,4 according women equal treat-
ment,5 and protecting the rights of the accused6 come to mind.
Most lawyers and many citizens could recall the federal constitu-
tional bases for judicial independence. Article III mandates that
positions be filled through appointment by the President and con-
firmation by the Senate.7 That formidable selection process almost
invariably ensures that federal judges are intelligent, well educated,
and professionally experienced. Those qualities are conducive to
judicial independence. In addition, federal judges enjoy the follow-
ing constitutional guarantees: life tenure during good behavior,8
non-reducible compensation, 9 and removal only through impeach-
ment. 10 These protections free federal judges from the need to be-
have in politically advantageous ways in order to keep their
positions." They also insulate judges from retribution when they
make unpopular decisions.' 2
3. E.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (rejecting the doctrine of
"separate but equal" in the public elementary school context).
4. E.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997) (holding that the Constitution does
not afford the president temporary immunity from civil damages litigation arising out
of events that occurred before he took office); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683
(1974) (holding that the president's interest in confidentiality did not outweigh the
Watergate special prosecutor's need for tape recordings and documents); Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (seizure of steel mills was not within
the constitutional power of the president).
5. E.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (holding that Virginia vio-
lated the equal protection clause by excluding women from a citizen-soldier program
offered at a military college).
6. E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that police must inform
suspects of their rights before questioning them during custodial interrogation).
7. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
8. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior
Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour.")
9. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior
Courts .... shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which
shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.")
10. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 ("The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of
the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction
of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.")
11. Troy A. Eid, Judicial Independence and Accountability: The Case Against
Electing Judges, COLO. LAW., July 2000, at 71.
At the founding of our country, Alexander Hamilton argued in Federalist
No. 78 that judicial independence was so important that federal judges must
be appointed for life. "Nothing will contribute so much ... to the indepen-
dent spirit in the judges," Hamilton argued, "as the permanent tenure of
judicial offices."
Id.
12. While judges must be accountable through appellate review for their decisions,
they need to be protected from unfair ad hominem attacks. Cf Hon. Susan Weber
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State judges may be less independent than their federal counter-
parts. Indeed, it has been remarked that "The state court house is,
if anything, too close to the state legislative house... ."'3 In many
states, particularly those where judges are elected at some or all
levels,'4 the screening process can be considerably less rigorous
than in the federal courts.'" Elections are frequently decided not
by qualifications (about which the voting public often knows little)
but by advertising. Campaign contributions that buy advertising
undermine judicial independence16 by clouding the exercise of ju-
dicial judgment with considerations related to financial obliga-
tion. 7 Also, state judges typically must win re-appointment or re-
election on a relatively frequent basis,' 8 sometimes every four or
Wright, In Defense of Judicial Independence, 25 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 633, 635
(2000) ("A judge who is concerned that his or her rulings might affect his or her
career is a judge who might lose focus on the most important of judicial duties: to
maintain the rule of law.")
13. Ellen Ash Peters, Common Law Judging in a Statutory World: An Address, 43
U. Prrr. L. REV. 995, 1007 (1982).
14. Sources differ as to the number of states that elect judges, although the num-
ber is considerable. Compare Eid, supra note 11, at 72 ("[Tlwenty-one states elect
appellate judges, trial judges, or both, either through partisan or non-partisan elec-
tions. The remaining states use some form of appointment process, and most of those
have a merit plan component."), with William V. Dorsaneo, Opening Comment to the
March 1999 Roy R. Ray Lecture "Judicial Independence and Democratic Accountabil-
ity in the Highest State Courts," 53 SMU L. REV. 255, 257 (2000) ("Although forty
states elect or re-elect some of their judges, only nine states, including Texas, do so
with regard to higher State Court judges through partisan judicial elections").
15. See generally Kathy Walt, Interest Continues to Grow in Appeals Court Races,
HOUSTON CHRON., Feb. 20, 2000 at 1 (describing a judge elected to the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals in 1996 despite "campaign trail confessions that he had, indeed, lied
about his background and the extent of his legal experience").
16. Eid, supra note 11, at 72 ("The increasingly high cost of judicial campaigns is
well documented. In 1986, the two candidates for chief justice of the Ohio Supreme
Court spent more than $3 million. Two years later, candidates for the six open seats
on the Texas Supreme Court raised more than $10 million.")
17. Cf Jerome J. Shestack, President's Message: The Risks to Judicial Indepen-
dence, A.B.A. J., June 1998, at 8 ("[A] judge who owes a seat to contributions from
politicians, labor leaders, corporate executives or lawyers suffers from a tarnished
independence.")
18. See AM. BAR Ass'N, AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY: REPORT OF THE ABA
COMMISSION ON SEPARATION OF POWERS AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE (1997),
http://www.abanet.org/govaffairs/judiciary/r5.html.
Unlike federal judges, the vast majority of state systems provide for the se-
lection or retention of judges through some form of popular election. Eight
states select judges through partisan elections. Thirteen do so through non-
partisan elections. Of the remaining twenty-nine states, initial appointments
are made by the governor or legislature in six states, and by some form of
merit selection commission in twenty-three states, but in seventeen of those
twenty-nine, the judges stand for reelection or retention election. In total,
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six years.' 9 With the shadow of the next campaign looming, it can
be hard to focus on doing what is right under the law and the facts,
rather than doing what is popular.
There are other obstacles to state judicial independence. The fi-
nancial provisions for state judicial service and retirement are
sometimes inadequate to attract or retain well qualified judges.2"
Controversial rulings may result in legislatures withholding salary
increases or reducing appropriations for the judicial system as a
whole.21 And criticism fueled by single-issue politics may cause
good judges to be swept from office by elective or appointive au-
thorities, or to voluntarily resign.22 Indeed, in some recent in-
stances, judges have even been threatened with physical violence
because of their decisions. 23 It has also been argued that state sys-
then, state judges are subject to election, reelection or retention election in
thirty-eight states.
Id.
19. For example, in Texas, state district judges are elected every four years, see
TEX. CONST. art. V, § 7, and state court of appeals justices are elected every six years,
see TEX. CONST. art. V, § 4.
20. See generally BERNARD S. MEYER, JUDICIAL RETIREMENT LAWS OF THE FIFTY
STATES AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 15-16, 24-26, 36-41 (1999) (discussing wide
variations in retirement benefits and compensation for judicial services rendered by
retired judges).
21. AM. BAR ASS'N, AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY: REPORT OF THE ABA COM-
MISSION ON SEPARATION OF POWERS AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE (1997), http://
www.abanet.org/govaffairs/judiciary/r5.html (reporting that "a representative of the
Conference of Chief Justices characterized 'the ability of legislatures to... determine
our budgets' as 'one of the greatest threats to judicial independence ... at the state
level'").
22. Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 315, 316 (1999) ("Today judges in some states are losing their offices because
decisions with which they are associated have become lightning rods for the purveyors
of single-issue politics.")
23. See Jerome J. Shestack, President's Message: The Risks to Judicial
Indpendence, 84 A.B.A. J. 8 (1998).
Threats of physical violence against judges are on the rise. An example is
the menacing messages to the chief justice of Oklahoma by organized militia
groups angered by the court's decisions limiting the ability of such groups to
act illegally. Obviously, this has a chilling effect on the court.
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tems imposing mandatory retirerhent based'on age 24 threaten judi-
cial independence.
Despite these threats, one could make a strong case that state
judges often exercise a high degree of judicial independence. An
excellent example is the transformation of American tort law dur-
ing the twentieth century. During the 1900s, state judges led the
fight to make the rules governing accident compensation more re-
sponsive to the needs of injured persons and the public interest in
deterring accidents.2 6 State judiciaries have also sometimes sur-
passed the federal courts in protecting individual rights.2 1 Thus, it
24. See ABA, STANDARDS FOR STATE JUDICIAL RETIREMENT STANDARD 5 CMT.
c (2000).
The provisions of jurisdictions that mandate retirement for age are far from
consistent. TWenty-four states require retirement on attaining 70, or at the
end of the year in which age 70 is attained. However, a number of those
provisions are not absolute: sixteen of the states make exceptions to the
stated requirement. In addition, four states set the age for mandatory retire-
ment at 72, one at 73, the District of Columbia at 74, and eight states at 75.
In these jurisdictions, too, there are a number of exceptions.
Id.
25. Christopher R. McFadden, Judicial Independence, Age-Based BFOOS, and the
Perils of Mandatory Retirement Policies for Appointed State Judges, 52 S.C. L. REV.
81, 134 (2000) (stating that mandatory retirement policies threaten judicial
independence).
26. Cf PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSE-
QUENCES 5-7 (1988) (criticizing the reformulation of American tort law which began
at mid-century with the efforts of academics and judges and ultimately "changed the
common law as profoundly as it had ever been changed before"), reviewed by Vincent
R. Johnson, Liberating Progress and the Free Market from the Specter of Tort Liability,
83 Nw. U. L. REV. 1026, 1045 (1989).
27. See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977). Commenting on the Brennan article,
an author who recently served as chief justice of the Connecticut Supreme Court
wrote:
[Justice Brennan's] famous 1977 article, "State Constitutions and the Protec-
tions of Individual Rights," was an eloquent and cogent reminder that be-
cause of dual sovereignty, state law and state courts could play an important
role as guarantors of civil and political rights. His article was a clarion call to
lawyers and judges not to overlook the capacity of state law, especially state
constitutional law, to assist in the pursuit of justice for all ....
Twenty years later, the judges and justices of the state courts have taken
Justice Brennan's message to heart by undertaking innovative measures to
protect individual rights through state constitutions and through indepen-
dent interpretations of the Federal Constitution ....
Ellen A. Peters, Capacity and Respect: A Perspective on the Historic Role of the State
Courts in the Federal System, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1065, 1066-67 (1998); see also Judith
S. Kaye, State Courts at The Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading
Statutes And Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 13 (1995) (discussing cases in which
state courts have concluded that their own constitutions afford greater protection
than the minimum floor provided by the federal Constitution).
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would be inaccurate and unfair to suggest that state courts are sub-
servient to the other state government branches or the whims of
public opinion.
If both the federal and state judiciaries exhibit judicial indepen-
dence, then judicial independence is not simply a function of provi-
sions governing judicial selection, compensation, and retention of
office, which differ greatly among the federal and state govern-
ments. There must be other factors that have allowed judicial inde-
pendence to flourish in America in a way that has often not been
the case in other countries.28
One factor easily overlooked, but quite significant, is the judicial
ethical norms that have developed in the United States. These
norms shape the conduct of American judges on a daily basis and
give concrete meaning to the idea that judges should be free from
undue or inappropriate pressures when performing the duties of
office.
In focusing primarily on these types of threats, this article is con-
cerned mainly with threats to "decisional" judicial independence,
rather than "institutional" independence. 29 However, to the extent
28. See generally Johannes Cahn, Judicial Independence: Controversies on the Con-
stitutional Jurisdiction of the Court of Final Appeal of the Hong Kong Special Adminis-
trative Region, 33 INT'L LA. 1015 (1999) (discussing judicial independence issues
arising under China's "one country, two systems" policy); Laifan Lin, Judicial Inde-
pendence in Japan: A Re-Investigation for China, 13 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 185 (1999)
("[I1n the history of Asian countries such as China and Japan, judicial power and
administrative power have long been one integrated mass, and thus, it is difficult to
establish an independent image of judicial power, which may be the situation in China
today"); Myint Zan, Judicial Independence in Burma: No March Backwards Towards
the Past, 1 ASIAN-PAc. L. & POL'Y J. 5, 1 (2000) (discussing how the military "eroded
and extinguished the independence of the judiciary in Burma"); see also Vincent Rob-
ert Johnson, The French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizens of 1789, the
Reign of Terror, and the Revolutionary Tribunal of Paris, 13 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 1, 14-24 (1990) (discussing how the absence of an independent judiciary to pro-
tect individual rights contributed to abuses during the French revolution).
29. Shirley Abrahamson describes the difference between the two concepts as
follows:
Scholars speak of two overlapping types of judicial independence: first, insti-
tutional judicial independence (sometimes referred to as branch indepen-
dence), and second, individual judicial independence (sometimes referred to
as decisional independence).
Institutional judicial independence, or branch independence, embodies
the concept that the judiciary is a separate branch of government acting in-
dependently of the legislative and executive branches. Institutional judicial
independence involves the relations between the branches of government
and is closely related to the separation of power doctrine. Under our form of
government, the judicial branch checks over-concentrations of power in the
executive and legislative branches. Although an independent branch, the ju-
diciary is dependent on the executive and legislative branches for funding,
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that the relevant ethical norms have been codified in all states and
are enforced by disciplinary tribunals, there is obviously an impor-
tant institutional dimension to these norms. Without these en-
forceable norms,3" the concept of American judicial independence,
as manifested in the conduct of judges, would be uncertain, widely
variable, and perhaps unrecognizable.
H. RULES OF JUDICIAL ETHICS BEARING ON
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
The principal guide on issues involving the conduct of the judici-
ary is the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct (the Judicial Eth-
ics Code).31 The current code and its predecessor 32 have
influenced the law throughout the country.33 It must be empha-
for establishing the court structure and jurisdiction of the courts, and often
for selection of judges. Institutional judicial independence refers to indepen-
dence of the judiciary as a body. Institutional judicial independence in turn
serves individual judicial independence.
Individual judicial independence, or decisional independence, embodies
the concept that individual judges decide cases fairly, impartially, and ac-
cording to the facts and the law, not according to whim, prejudice, fear, or
the dictates of the legislative or executive branches or the latest public opin-
ion poll. Individual judicial independence is crucial to ensuring that each
case is resolved according to the law. Individual judicial independence is
thus a means to an end-the end being the resolution of disputes based on
law.
Shirley S. Abrahamson, Courtroom with a View: Building Judicial Independence with
Public Participation, 8 WILLAMETT'E J. INT'L L. & DisP. RESOL. 13, 15-16 (2000); see
also Thomas L. Cooper, Attacks on Judicial Independence: The PBA Response, 72 PA.
B. Ass'N Q. 60, 61 (2001).
There are two separate sides to the judicial independence coin. One side
takes the form of "decisional" independence, or the right of each judge to
decide a matter before him free of outside pressure or influence. The other
side of the coin is "institutional" independence, or the right of the entire
judicial system, as a separate branch of government, to be free from outside
attack by individuals or by other branches of the government.
Id.
30. See generally Randy J. Holland & Cynthia Gray, Judicial Discipline: Indepen-
dence with Accountability, 5 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 117, 125-37 (2000) (discussing the
state judicial conduct organizations and federal judicial councils that enforce judicial
ethics rules).
31. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1990).
32. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1972).
33. A brief history of judicial ethics codes states:
In 1924, the ABA adopted the Canons of Judicial Ethics. During the 1960s,
the federal Judicial Conference of the United States developed standards for
federal judges. Soon after the ABA adopted the Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility [in 1969], the ABA appointed a commission to produce
a revised code of conduct for judges. The resulting document... [was] the
1972 Code of Judicial Conduct. In 1990, the ABA replaced the 1972 Code
20021 1013
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sized that state codes vary from the ABA model in numerous re-
spects, so the code of the jurisdiction in question must be consulted
in any given case. For example, since all judges are elected in
Texas, the Texas canon on political activities by judges and judicial
candidates is materially different from the parallel canon in the
ABA code.34
It would be easy to read the entire Code of Judicial Conduct as
an homage to the principle of judicial independence. Indeed, the
first sentence of the preamble states: "Our legal system is based on
the principle that an independent, fair and competent judiciary will
interpret and apply the laws that govern us."'35 Canon 1 then pro-
claims the leitmotif that animates every section of the Code and
many decisions interpreting its provisions: "A judge shall uphold
the integrity and independence of the judiciary. ' 36 Further, as-
pirants for judicial office are admonished to "maintain the dignity
appropriate to judicial office and act in a manner consistent with
the integrity and independence of the judiciary."37
Still, it is more instructive to focus on substantive provisions in
the judicial ethics code designed to minimize intrusions upon inde-
pendent judicial decision making. There are at least four areas of
concern directly bearing on judicial independence. These catego-
ries encompass the rules relating to (1) ex parte communications,
(2) gifts, (3) political activities, and (4) certain problematic rela-
tionships. The standards governing each of these subjects define,
in large measure, the ethical foundations of American judicial
independence.
A. Ex Parte Communications
It is axiomatic under the American system of justice that all sides
to a dispute have a right to be heard. The rules38 prohibiting sub-
with a new Code of Judicial Conduct. By 1999, twenty state supreme courts
had adopted new standards of judicial conduct based in whole or in part on
the 1990 Model Code of Judicial Conduct.
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY STANDARDS, RULES & STATUTES 989 (John S.
Dzienkowski ed., abridged ed. 2001).
34. Cf. TEX. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 5, reprinted in TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN.,
tit. 2, subtit. G app. B (Vernon Supp. 2000), with MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CON-
DUCT Canon 5 (1990).
35. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 1 (1990).
36. Id. at Canon 1.
37. Id. at Canon 5(A)(3)(a).
38. There are two sets of ethics rules relating to ex parte communication. The one
is found in the judges' code and the other is found in the lawyers' code. Canon 3B(7)
of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct provides:
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stantive 39 ex parte40 communications about pending or impending
cases protect this fundamental right, but in fact they sweep more
broadly. The rules ban not merely private communications be-
tween a judge and a litigant or the litigant's lawyer. They also pro-
hibit a wide range of undisclosed communications between a judge
and any other person about the merits of a case. There are a few
narrow, logical exceptions41 to the general principle. The excep-
A judge shall accord to every person who has a legal interest in a proceed-
ing, or that person's lawyer, the right to be heard according to law. A judge
shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications, or consider
other communications made to the judge outside the presence of the parties
concerning a pending or impending proceeding ....
Id. at Canon 3(B)(7). Rule 3.5 of the Model Code of Prof'l Conduct states:
A lawyer shall not:
(a) seek to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror or other official by
means prohibited by law;
(b) communicate ex parte with such a person except as permitted by
law ....
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 3.5 (1983). These provisions need to be read
in conjunction, for most judges are lawyers, and thus subject ot both codes. In addi-
tion, "It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to ... knowingly assist a judge or
judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct."
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 8.4(f) (1983).
39. A distinction is drawn by the judicial ethics code between communications
relating to substantive matters or the merits of a case, on the one hand, and other
types of communications. According to Canon 3B(7)(a) of the Model Code of Judi-
cial Conduct:
Where circumstances require, ex parte communications for scheduling, ad-
ministrative purposes or emergencies that do not deal with substantive mat-
ters or issues on the merits are authorized; provided:
(i) the judge reasonably believes that no party will gain a procedural or
tactical advantage as a result of the ex parte communication, and
(ii) the judge makes provision promptly to notify all other parties of the
substance of the ex parte communication and allows an opportunity to
respond.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3B(7)(a) (1990). See also In re Arrigan,
678 A.2d 446 (R.I. 1996) (holding that a judge's communications with workers' com-
pensation insurers were administrative in nature and did not constitute unethical ex
parte communications). But see In re Phalen, 475 S.E.2d 327, 334 (W. Va. 1996)
(holding that a family law master's ex parte discussion with litigants regarding selling
home products to increase their incomes indirectly concerned pending proceedings in
which the parties sought an order to reduce the husband's child support payments and
thus violated the judicial conduct canon proscribing ex parte communications con-
cerning a pending or impending proceeding).
40. The terms "ex parte" and "ex parte communication" have been variously de-
fined. When used as an adjective, "ex parte" means "done or made at the instance
and for the benefit of one party only, and without notice to, or argument by, any
person adversely interested." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 597 (7th ed. 1999). "Ex
parte communication" means "[a] generally prohibited communication between
counsel and the court when opposing counsel is not present." Id.
41. Canon 3B(7)(d) and (e) of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct provide:
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tions permit substantive communications between a judge and
members of the judge's staff42 or other judges,4 3 and even commu-
nications with disinterested legal experts, provided the parties to
the case are fully informed of what the experts say and allowed to
respond.44 Otherwise, judges are prohibited from discussing the
merits of the suits before them with third parties. By insulating
judges from contact with outside influences during the decision
making process, the ethical standards tend to ensure that judges act
independently when performing their judicial duties.
It is difficult to overstate the importance of the rules against ex
parte communication. The rules help to ensure that a judge's deci-
sion is based on nothing other than law and evidence.45 Without
such provisions, it would be impossible for parties to effectively
address the factual assertions and legal arguments placed before
judges. Moreover, public confidence in the judicial process would
be undermined because the citizenry would be deprived of the in-
formation that emerges from an open and transparent litigation
process. Indeed, the public would not even know the identity of
the persons who are making arguments that may prove critical in
the resolution of pending matters.
(d) A judge may, with the consent of the parties, confer separately with the
parties and their lawyers in an effort to mediate or settle matters pending
before the judge.
(e) A judge may initiate or consider any ex parte communications when ex-
pressly authorized by law to do so.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3B(7)(d), (e) (1990).
42. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3B(7)(c) (1990) ("A judge may
consult with court personnel whose function is to aid the judge in carrying out the
judge's adjudicative responsibilities . . ").
43. See id. ("A judge may consult with... other judges").
44. Canon 3B(7)(b) of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct provides:
(b) A judge may obtain the advice of a disinterested expert on the law appli-
cable to a proceeding before the judge if the judge gives notice to the parties
of the person consulted and the substance of the advice, and affords the
parties reasonable opportunity to respond.
Id. at Canon 3B(7)(b).
45. Deanell Reece Tacha, Independence of the Judiciary for the Third Century, 46
MERCER L. REV. 645-46 (1995).
[J]udicial independence means simply that a life-tenured federal judge is
free from all political and other outside pressures to decide cases in a wholly
impartial manner. She must commit herself to following the Constitution,
the statutes, common law principles, and the precedent that interprets each
of them. Her decisionmaking is limited to properly admitted evidence, con-
strained by appropriate procedural rules, records, and legal principles. Pre-
vailing political winds have no effect. The codes of conduct require a judge
to adhere not only to the principle of actual impartiality and absence of
outside influence, but also require a judge to be free from even the appear-
ance of any improper influence.
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Not surprisingly, allegations of improper ex parte communica-
tions are taken seriously, and violations can result in sanctions that
carry with them the sting of disgrace. The careers of jurists on the
high courts of New York46 and Texas47 have been rocked by
charges of improper ex parte contact, and discipline has been im-
posed in a range of cases.48 Although such controversies normally
concern cases in the judge's own court, discipline may also be im-
posed on a judge with respect to ex parte communications involv-
ing cases pending before another judge.49
If third persons were allowed to communicate with sitting judges
about pending matters through channels outside the normal litiga-
tion process, the administration of justice would be considerably
less independent than it is today. Judges would be subject to many
potentially disruptive influences, including those exerted by per-
sons with neither a direct stake in the case nor an interest in the
fair and impartial resolution of the dispute. Thus, the ethical rules
against ex parte contact are fundamental pillars of American judi-
cial independence.
46. See In re Fuchsberg, 426 N.Y.S.2d 639, 646-47 (Ct. Jud. 1978) (holding that
improper communications with law professors subjected a judge to censure and
disapproval).
47. See Sam Kinch, Jr., Power Struggle in Austin, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr.
11, 1986, at 19A (detailing the ethics controversy relating to ex parte communication
by a San Antonio lawyer with a justice of the Texas Supreme Court), 1986 WL
4313772. The Commission on Judicial Conduct reprimanded the justice. R.G. Rat-
cliffe, State Ethics Panel Scolds Pair of Justices for Poor Conduct, Hous. CHRON., June
10, 1987, at 1 (reporting the circumstances surrounding the reprimand), 1987 WL
5616096; Terrence Stutz, 2 Justices Cited for Misconduct, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
June 10, 1987, at 1A (explaining the grounds for discipline), 1987 WL 4613603.
48. See, e.g., Miss. Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Dodds, 680 So. 2d 180, 200
(Miss. 1996) (holding that removal was warranted for a judge who, among other
things, engaged in ex parte communications); see also In re Fine, 13 P.3d 400 (Nev.
2000) (holding that expert who was first approached, hired, and paid for by a party in
a child custody matter was not "court personnel" with whom judge could conduct
even limited ex parte communications; the judge was removed from office).
49. See Miss. Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Brown, 761 So. 2d 182, 186
(Miss. 2000) (holding that a public reprimand and fine are warranted where a judge
commits judicial misconduct prejudicial to the administration of justice by making ex
parte contacts with the judge assigned to his son's DUI case, including contacting an
arresting officer and that officer's supervisor); In re Santini, 597 A.2d 1388 (N.J. 1991)
(holding that conduct by municipal court judge in contacting three public officials on
behalf of previous client warrants public reprimand); In re Larsen, 616 A.2d 529 (Pa.
1992) (holding that ex parte communication by an associate justice of the Supreme
Court with a common pleas court judge relating to a matter pending before her war-
ranted public reprimand notwithstanding lack of improper motive).
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B. Gifts
Gifts can create a sense of obligation on the part of the recipient
and an expectation of reciprocal benefit on the part of the donor.
In the judicial context, such obligations and expectations threaten
to distort the adjudicatory process by creating a risk that decisions
will be based on considerations other than merit.
The danger posed by gifts and similar benefits5" is actually two-
fold. First, there is the risk that a decision will be made by a judge
who has been improperly influenced by a gift. Second, even if the
judge has not been improperly influenced, there is a risk that the
public will perceive a lack of impartiality. In the former situation,
litigants and the public are deprived of the benefits of an indepen-
dent judiciary. In the latter, the appearance of impropriety under-
mines public confidence in the judicial system. Either way, the
public loses.5
As one would expect, the judicial ethics code contains an exten-
sive, carefully crafted set of rules that attempt to distinguish gifts
that pose unacceptable risks from those which are unobjection-
able.52 Thus, gifts that are ordinary53 or appropriate in light of the
50. The rule in the judicial code applies equally to a "gift, bequest, favor or loan."
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4(d)(5) (1990).
51. Cf Abrahamson, supra note 29, at 24 (2000).
The public's willingness to support and fight for judicial independence de-
pends on the public's understanding of, and trust and confidence in, the judi-
cial system. A public that does not trust its judges to exercise even-handed
judgment will look upon judicial independence as a problem to be
eradicated.
Id.
52. According to Canon 4D(5) of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct:
A judge shall not accept, and shall urge members of the judge's family resid-
ing in the judge's household not to accept, a gift, bequest, favor or loan from
anyone except for:
(a) a gift incident to a public testimonial, books, tapes and other resource
materials supplied by publishers on a complimentary basis for official use, or
an invitation to the judge and the judge's spouse or guest to attend a bar-
related function or an activity devoted to the improvement of the law, the
legal system or the administration of justice;
(b) a gift, award or benefit incident to the business, profession or other sep-
arate activity of a spouse or other family member of a judge residing in the
judge's household, including gifts, awards and benefits for the use of both
the spouse or other family member and the judge (as spouse or family mem-
ber), provided the gift, award or benefit could not reasonably be perceived
as intended to influence the judge in the performance of judicial duties;
(c) ordinary social hospitality;
(d) a gift from a relative or friend, for a special occasion, such as a wedding,
anniversary or birthday, if the gift is fairly commensurate with the occasion
and the relationship;
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circumstances, relationships, or occasion 54 are overlooked, while
gifts that come from persons likely to appear before the court, ei-
ther personally or by interest, are forbidden."
Prohibited gifts can take many forms including a flight on an air-
plane,5 6 use of a condominium,57 cash payments,5 8 meals,5 9 a dis-
(e) a gift, bequest, favor or loan from a relative or close personal friend
whose appearance or interest in a case would in any event require disqualifi-
cation under Section 3E;
(f) a loan from a lending institution in its regular course of business on the
same terms generally available to persons who are not judges;
(g) a scholarship or fellowship awarded on the same terms and based on the
same criteria applied to other applicants; or
(h) any other gift, bequest, favor or loan, only if: the donor is not a party or
other person who has come or is likely to come or whose interests have
come or are likely to come before the judge; and, if its value exceeds
$150.00, the judge reports it in the same manner as the judge reports com-
pensation in Section 4H.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr Canon 4D(5) (1990).
53. Id. at Canon 4D(5)(c) (permitting "ordinary social hospitality"), (d) (permit-
ting certain gifts from friends and relatives on special occasions), (f) (permitting loans
on ordinary terms), and (g) (permitting scholarships and fellowships awarded on ordi-
nary terms).
54. Id. at Canon 4D(5)(a) (permitting gifts incidental to public testimonials,
materials for official use, and bar-related invitations), (b) (permitting certain gifts in-
cidental to the career of a judge's spouse).
55. The judicial code's prohibition on gifts contains a broad exception that permits
acceptance of a gift if "the donor is not a party or other person who has come or is
likely to come or whose interests have come or are likely to come before the judge,"
provided that reporting requirements are met. Id. at Canon 4D(5)(h).
56. Jeffrey M. Shaman, Texas Supreme Court Justices Publicly Reprimanded, Ad-
monished, 9 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1 (1987) (discussing discipline based on free flights);
see also Tobias Weiss, Judicial Independence: Another Viewpoint, FED. LAW., Aug., at
39 (1999).
Even the highest court is not exempt [from criticism relating to gifts]. Where
Supreme Court justices declined to review favorable decisions for West Pub-
lishing Company after taking trips for which West paid, a news magazine
reported that in Washington "the Judiciary is joining cabinet members and
lawyers on the suspect list." Although related to West-sponsored awards,
they were regarded as junkets, about which Ralph Nader said he would com-
plain "to the U.S. Judicial Conference about judges' roles in the West
award."
Id.
57. Adams v. Comm'n on Judicial Performance, 897 P.2d 544, 562 (Cal. 1995).
58. In re Cunningham, 538 A.2d 473 (Pa. 1988) (holding that judges' acceptance of
cash "gifts" from union warranted sanctions of suspension and removal or forfeiture
of office).
59. Cf. In re D'Auria, 334 A.2d 332, 333 (N.J. 1975) (holding that a compensation
judge acted improperly when he regularly had lunch as a guest of persons who were
attorneys or representatives of insurance companies in pending workmen's compensa-
tion matters and that the appropriate sanction was suspension from the practice of
law).
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count on wallpaper, or an unreasonably favorable deal on the
purchase 61 or rental62 of a car. Other provisions in the judicial eth-
ics code dealing with excessive compensation of judges for extra-
judicial tasks are akin to the rules governing gifts. 63 By barring
jurists from being paid more than a non-jurist for performing an
extra-judicial task, the compensation rules seek to prevent the con-
ferral of benefits having monetary value that can threaten judicial
independence by predisposing a judge to favor the interests of the
payor.
Absent the rules on gifts and excessive extra-judicial compensa-
tion, it would be considerably more difficult for judges to be, in
reality or appearance, independent from improper influences when
deciding the disputes that come before them. A system in which
gifts to judges are unregulated is one in which judges could not be
expected to decide all suits fairly.
C. Political Activities
The ethical rules governing political activity by judges and judi-
cial candidates are exceptionally complex. Under the judicial eth-
ics code, certain rules apply to all judges and candidates. For
example, Canon 5 provides, with three important exceptions,64 that
60. In re Kral, 1 111. Cts. Com. 20 (1973), cited in Adams v. Comm'n on Judicial
Performance, 882 P.2d 358, 379 (Cal. 1994).
61. Adams v. Comm'n on Judicial Performance, 882 P.2d 358, 379-80 (Cal. 1994).
62. In re Seraphim, 294 N.W.2d 485, 498-99 (Wis. 1980).
63. Canon 4H(1) of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct provides in relevant part:
A judge may receive compensation and reimbursement of expenses for the
extra-judicial activities permitted by this Code, if the source of such pay-
ments does not give the appearance of influencing the judge's performance
of judicial duties or otherwise give the appearance of impropriety.
(a) Compensation shall not exceed a reasonable amount nor shall it exceed
what a person who is not a judge would receive for the same activity.
(b) Expense reimbursement shall be limited to the actual cost of travel, food
and lodging reasonably incurred by the judge and, where appropriate to the
occasion, by the judge's spouse or guest. Any payment in excess of such an
amount is compensation.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4H(1) (1990).
64. Canon 5B(2)(b) provides:
[A] non-judge candidate for appointment to judicial office may .... unless
otherwise prohibited by law:
(i) retain an office in a political organization,
(ii) attend political gatherings, and
(iii) continue to pay ordinary assessments and ordinary contributions to a
political organization or candidate and purchase tickets for political party
dinners or other functions.
Id. at Canon 5B(2)(b). Canon 5C(1) provides:
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a judge or a candidate for election or appointment to judicial
office shall not: (a) act as a leader or hold an office in a political
organization; (b) publicly endorse or publicly oppose another
candidate for public office; (c) make speeches on behalf of a
political organization; (d) attend political gatherings; or (e) so-
licit funds for, pay an assessment to or make a contribution to a
political organization or candidate, or purchase tickets for politi-
cal party dinners or other functions.65
These basic rules are supplemented by two other sets of rules,
one applying only to candidates seeking appointment to judicial or
governmental office 6 6 and the other applying only to judges and
candidates subject to public election.67
In general, the ethics rules on political activity are intended to
distance judges and candidates from the pressures of politics.
However, it is necessary to accommodate the reality that many
judges must run for election and that political parties often play a
role in judicial elections and appointments. Such accommodations
undoubtedly cause the ethics rules to fall short of wholly separating
judicial decision making from politics. For example, the rules pro-
vide that the solicitation of campaign contributions for judicial
races be handled by committees and that judges not personally so-
A judge or a candidate subject to public election may, except as prohibited
by law:
(a) at any time
(i) purchase tickets for and attend political gatherings;
(ii) identify himself or herself as a member of a political party; and
(iii) contribute to a political organization;
(b) when a candidate for election
(i) speak to gatherings on his or her own behalf;
(ii) appear in newspaper, television and other media advertisements
supporting his or her candidacy;
(iii) distribute pamphlets and other promotional campaign literature
supporting his or her candidacy; and
(iv) publicly endorse or publicly oppose other candidates for the same
judicial office in a public election in which the judge or judicial candi-
date is running.
Id. at Canon 5C(1). Canon 5C(5) provides:
Except as prohibited by law, a candidate for judicial office in a public elec-
tion may permit the candidate's name:
(a) to be listed on election materials along with the names of other candi-
dates for elective public office, and
(b) to appear in promotions of the ticket.
Id. at Canon 5C(5).
65. Id. at Canon 5A.
66. Id. at Canon 5B.
67. Id. at Canon 5C.
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licit or accept contributions.68 But to the extent that judges are
allowed to know who has contributed to their campaigns, deci-
sional judicial independence is threatened.69
Nevertheless, some provisions in the judicial ethics code go quite
far to take politics out of judicial elections. The provisions gov-
erning statements made by candidates in judicial campaigns are
one example. Ordinarily, the essence of a political campaign is to
discuss the issues of the day, to promise action, and to criticize
one's opponent. However, under vigorously enforced ethics provi-
sions, a candidate for judicial office shall not
(i) make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than
the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the
office;
(ii) make statements that commit or appear to commit the can-
didate with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are
likely to come before the court; or
(iii) knowingly misrepresent the identity, qualifications, present
position or other fact concerning the candidate or an
opponent.7 °
68. Id. at Canon 5C(2).
69. Cf. Rusty Robnett, Judicial Independence-Deja Vu?, 44 FED. ADVOCATE 4
(2001).
Judicial independence was ... under attack in several states during the last
election cycle. Literally millions of dollars were raised and spent by political
action committees and other groups across the political spectrum in attempts
to defeat or retain appellate judges. Examples include the judicial races in
Ohio, Michigan, Illinois, Alabama, and Mississippi. In several instances,
contributions were in the upper six figure or seven figure range. These con-
tributions were often made by groups whose members were directly im-
pacted by decisions issued by those courts.
Id. See also Eid, supra note 11, at 72 (2001), stating:
Another concern is the strong correlation between campaign contributions
and the outcomes in specific cases. CBS's 60 Minutes program first popular-
ized this connection in its memorable report on the 1980s Texaco v. Pennzoil
decision by the Texas Supreme Court. In that case, Texaco donated $72,700
to several Texas Supreme Court justices. Not to be outdone, Pennzoil
donated more than $315,000 to the justices. Pennzoil received a $10.53 bil-
lion award ....
Id. According to Dorsaneo, supra note 14, at 258 n.7 (2000):
[A] study conducted by Texans for Public Justice (TPJ) supports the position
that sizable campaign contributions corrupt the appearance of judicial inde-
pendence. According to this study, more than forty percent of the $9.2 mil-
lion raised by the seven winning judicial candidates for the Texas Supreme
Court in 1994 and in 1996 came from parties with cases before the court, or
from sources closely affiliated with those parties.
70. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCt Canon 5A(3)(d) (1990).
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By removing judges from the political fray, these rules tend to
facilitate judicial independence. Judges are not tied to issue-based
constituencies, nor does the risk of inconsistency with prior cam-
paign statements deny them the freedom to consider each case on
its merits.
The pursuit of judicial independence through campaign speech
restrictions may come at a heavy price since the rules deprive the
voting public and appointing authorities of much information they
would prefer to have.71 It is interesting to consider the value
choices that drive the campaign-statement ethics rules. In
America, free speech is among the most highly prized liberties.72
The ethics rules say that in the context of judicial campaigns, the
furtherance of judicial independence often trumps free speech.73
Some courts have refused to endorse that position,74 but ethical
limitations on the political conduct of judges have generally been
upheld.
While the rules of judicial ethics certainly do not wholly insulate
judges from the pernicious influence of politics, they undoubtedly
contribute to the independence of the judiciary.
71. See generally In re Riley, 691 P.2d 695, 708 (Ariz. 1984) (C.J. Holohan dissent-
ing) (arguing that the restrictions announced by the majority limiting statements by
lawyer candidates for judicial office were incompatible with the freedoms granted by
the First Amendment). See also Vincent R. Johnson, Ethical Campaigning for the
Judiciary, 29 TEX. TECH L. REV. 811, 833 (1998) (suggesting that a broad interpreta-
tion of the ethics rule prohibiting discussion of justiciable issues may mean that "the
public is relegated to vapid campaign rhetoric").
72. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
73. See generally Riley, 691 P.2d at 704 (stating that lawyers who are candidates
for judicial office may not make statements that question the decisions of judges). See
Discipline of Hopewell, 507 N.W.2d 911, 917 (S.D. 1993).
A lawyer may engage in political activity and speak as freely as any other
citizen. But in a contest between lawyers for a judicial office, a lawyer under
his oath and the duties imposed upon him by law has an added responsibility
and should seek to maintain a higher standard of conduct than can be ex-
pected of one who is not a member of a privileged and a responsible profes-
sion (citation omitted) ... The right of free speech does not 'give a lawyer
the right to openly denigrate the court in the eyes of the public.'
Id.
74. See Richard A. Dove, National Summit on Improving Judicial Selection: Judi-
cial Campaign Conduct: Rules, Education, and Enforcement, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REV.
1447, 1448 (2001) ("[Sjome courts have found attempts to regulate judicial campaign
conduct to be overbroad restrictions on a candidate's First Amendment rights to com-
municate his or her message to the electorate.").
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D. Certain Problematic Relationships
Threaded throughout the judicial ethics code are a variety of
provisions concerned with preventing harm to the administration
of justice through problematic relationships between judges and
other persons or entities. This concern is reflected generally in Ca-
non 2B, which cautions that "[a] judge shall not allow family, so-
cial, political, or other relationships to influence the judge's
conduct or judgment." However, other provisions are more spe-
cific. Some rules deal with relationships that should be avoided so
a judge may perform judicial tasks, while others address unavoida-
ble relationships that require a judge to stand aside. In the former
category are provisions relating to judicial participation in govern-
mental, civic, and charitable activities7" and to the financial activi-
ties of judges. Canon 4C(3)(a) states:
(a) A judge shall not serve as an officer, director, trustee or
non-legal advisor if it is likely that the organization will be en-
gaged in proceedings that would ordinarily come before the
judge, or will be engaged frequently in adversary proceedings in
the court of which the judge is a member or in any court subject
to the appellate jurisdiction of the court of which the judge is a
member.
Further, Canon 4D(1) says, "A judge shall not engage in finan-
cial and business dealings that involve the judge in frequent trans-
actions or continuing business relationships with those lawyers or
other persons likely to come before the court on which the judge
serves."
Framed in prophylactic terms, it is reasonable to suggest that
these provisions are designed, at least in part, to ensure that if a
judge decides a matter, the judge does so only where there is no
foreseeable risk to the exercise of independent judgment.76 If a
business partner or an organization in which the judge participates
75. A myriad of rules under Canon 4 seek to address the issues raised by a judge's
extra-judicial activities. The rules are driven by a variety of objectives. See MODEL
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr Canon 4A(3) (1990) (minimizing interference with the
performance of judicial duties); id. at Canon 4A(2) (preserving the prestige of judicial
office); id. at Canon 4C(3)(b)(iv) (avoiding the use of judicial office for the advance-
ment of private interests). Furthermore, a judge "shall not personally participate in
the solicitation of funds or other fund-raising activities" of a private organization. Id.
at Canon 4C(3)(b)(i). Only some of the rules relating to extra-judicial activities are
intended to preserve judicial independence in the sense that they seek to ensure that
judges are not exposed to undue or inappropriate pressures that might intrude upon
judicial decision making. See id. at Canons 4A and 4C.
76. In this respect, the provisions under discussion are somewhat different from
another provision in the code dealing with impermissible relationships, Canon 2C.
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is a litigant in the judge's court, the circumstances may give rise to
an unacceptable appearance of impropriety.77 If the judge's impar-
tiality might reasonably be questioned, recusal may be required, 78
but if the facts are such that recusal is not necessary, there may
nevertheless be a threat to the judge's exercise of independent
judgment by reason of the pre-existing relationship. To the extent
that they reach beyond the provisions governing disqualification,
the quoted rules seek to eliminate that threat to judicial
independence.
The rules on disqualification address, among other things, rela-
tionships that generally cannot be avoided, but which are so prob-
lematic that recusal is required. Thus, under Canon 3E(1):
A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in
which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned,
including but not limited to instances where . . . (b) the judge
[previously] served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a
lawyer with whom the judge previously practiced law served
during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter ... ;
[or] (d) the judge or the judge's spouse, or a person within the
third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of
such a person: (i) is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, di-
rector or trustee of a party; (ii) is acting as a lawyer in the pro-
ceeding; (iii) is known by the judge to have a more than de
minimis interest that could be substantially affected by the pro-
ceeding; [or] (iv) is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a mate-
rial witness in the proceeding ...
A judge shall not hold membership in any organization that practices invidious dis-
crimination on the basis of race, sex, religion or national origin. The commentary to
Canon 2C makes clear that the rule is concerned mainly with avoiding the appearance
of impropriety rather than the threat that judicial decision making will be influenced
by the judge's relationship to the organization. It states in relevant part:
Membership of a judge in an organization that practices invidious discrimi-
nation gives rise to perceptions that the judge's impartiality is impaired ...
[A] judge's membership in an organization that engages in any discrimina-
tory membership practices prohibited by the law of the jurisdiction also vio-
lates Canon 2 and Section 2A and gives the appearance of impropriety ...
Moreover, public manifestation by a judge of the judge's knowing approval
of invidious discrimination on any basis gives the appearance of impropriety
under Canon 2 and diminishes public confidence in the integrity and imparti-
ality of the judiciary, in violation of Section 2A.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr Canon 2C (1990).
77. See id. at Canon 2 ("A judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all of the judge's activities.").
78. See id. at Canon 3E (2000) (discussing disqualification).
79. Id. at Canon 3E(1).
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Where these types of relationships exist, there is a chance that
the judge will be tempted toward favoritism on behalf of the per-
son in question. However, the risks extend beyond favoritism.
There is also a threat that the persons related to the judge will en-
deavor to exploit the relationship by exerting pressure with respect
to the decision of pending matters. That is, the relationship
presents an occasion for the exercise of inappropriate pressure,
which, if unaddressed, might corrupt the decision making process.
To avoid this danger, the rules on disqualification require recusal.
The rules can therefore be understood as intended, in part,8 ° to
prevent threats to decisional judicial independence that arise when
persons closely connected to the judge are involved in litigation
before the judge's court.
III. REINFORCEMENT OF JUDICIAL NORMS THROUGH CODES
APPLICABLE TO LAWYERS
The provisions in the judicial ethics code that foster independent
decision making by judges are buttressed by principles of profes-
sional responsibility applicable to lawyers. The Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, for example, provide that, "It is professional
misconduct for a lawyer to... knowingly assist a judge or judicial
officer in conduct that is a violation of applicable rules of judicial
conduct .... "81 Thus, threats to judicial independence that involve
lawyers-such as ex parte communications or gifts made by coun-
sel-are deterred from both ends. Not only is the judge prohibited
from participating in such conduct, but lawyers, under penalty of
discipline, are deterred from knowingly assisting a judge to violate
standards of judicial ethics.
In addition, it is generally recognized that lawyers have a duty to
protect judicial independence by defending judges from unjust crit-
icism.82 The now-superseded Code of Professional Responsibility
stated that "[a]djudicatory officials, not being wholly free to defend
themselves, are entitled to receive the support of the bar against
80. Under the rules of judicial ethics, there are a variety of situations in which a
judge must step aside, rather than decide a case. Many of these involve threats to
impartiality, such as personal prejudice, id. at Canon 3E(1)(a), or knowledge of dis-
puted evidentiary facts, id. at Canon 3E(1)(a), but could not easily be said to entail a
threat to judicial independence as a result of inappropriate outside pressures.
81. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(f) (1983).
82. See generally James Podgers and John Gibeaut, Speaking Out for Judges: ABA
Acts to Reinforce Defense of Judicial Independence, 84 A.B.A. J. 86, 86 (1998) (dis-
cussing ABA efforts to defend judges from political attacks).
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unjust criticism.83 While this language, unfortunately, was not car-
ried forward into the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the
obligation is still widely recognized.84 For example, in its recent
report on judicial independence, the American Bar Association
recommended that
State and local bar associations . .. develop effective mecha-
nisms for evaluating and, when appropriate, promptly respond-
ing to misleading criticism of federal judges and judicial
decisions in each federal judicial district.85
Such action by the bar diminishes the influence of those who
would seek to intrude upon judicial decision-making by means of
unwarranted attacks. The defense of judges from unfair comment
tends to ensure that judges will not be swayed by inappropriate
influences and will act independently based solely on the law and
evidence.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE INDISPENSABLE CONTRIBUTION OF
ETHICS TO AMERICAN JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
Structural considerations alone, such as those which govern the
selection, compensation, and retention of judges, cannot ensure ju-
dicial independence.86 Those matters are undoubtedly important
in creating an environment in which judicial independence can
flourish. But ultimately, judicial independence depends on the eth-
ical norms that regulate recurring threats to the judicial decision-
making process.
The principles of judicial ethics which prohibit ex parte commu-
nications and improper gifts; limit political activities of judges; re-
quire judges to avoid certain problematic relationships; and
mandate recusal from cases involving closely connected persons
make a major contribution toward the independence of the Ameri-
can judiciary. It is easy to take these norms for granted, as they are
now well-integrated into our expectations of judicial conduct. One
can overlook their role in ensuring that disputes are decided by
83. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 8-6 (1980).
84. See also Cooper, supra note 23, at 64 (2001) (discussing the responsibility of
the organized bar to respond to improper criticism of judges).
85. ABA COMM. ON SEPARATION OF POWERS AND JUD. INDEPENDENCE, AN IN-
DEPENDENT JUDICIARY (1997), http://www.abanet.org/govaffairs/judiciary/r6b.html.
86. Of course, reasonable people may differ about how much judicial indepen-
dence is desirable. No one would want courts that were completely unaccountable,
just as no one would want courts that were completely subservient. Judicial indepen-
dence and judicial accountability must co-exist, but a discussion of judicial accounta-
bility is beyond the scope of this article.
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jurists who are not subject to inappropriate or undue pressures.
Without these norms, however, an independent judiciary could not
exist.
The federal courts would neither be, nor appear to be, indepen-
dent, if unknown third persons were free to communicate with
judges about pending disputes; if litigants could make substantial
gifts to judges; if judges played an active role in national political
campaigns; or if judges had close ties to the persons whose cases
they decide. Conversely, even when state judges are not protected
by life-time appointments, guarantees of non-reducible compensa-
tion, or removal only through an arduous impeachment process,
they can still be perceived as exhibiting an important degree of in-
dependence if insulated by ethical standards from improper com-
munications, gifts, activities, and relationships.
The independence of the American judiciary depends heavily on
the ethical standards that prevent or mitigate harm to the exercise
of judicial judgment by inappropriate pressures flowing from activ-
ities or relationships involving persons outside the court. Absent
those safeguards, the status, operations, and effectiveness of the
judiciary would be vastly different from what it is today.
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